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From a Darwinian evolutionary viewpoint there should be no radical break. If the emer-33 gence of language and symbolic systems is simply due to differential reproductive success 34 measured at the individual level then it is appropriate to speak of differences in the tempo of 35 evolution but not of discontinuities. But the Darwinian perspective of evolution driven solely 36 by differential reproductive success acting on variation in the genome of individuals is only 37 one modality for evolutionary change and one that elevates change in genomic structure to 38 a privileged position that does not appear to be in accord with observations about behavior. 39 Behaviors can and do arise that fail to maximize Darwinian fitness. And language, symbols 40 and constructed meanings have enabled change in behaviors to take place on a time scale 41 incommensurate with a time scale for genetic mutations and change in allele frequency via 42 differential reproductive success-the currency of natural selection.
43
Let us consider behavior to be the outward manifestation of an organism's response 44 to sensory information it has received and incorporated in its internal representation of 45 the characteristics and properties of the environment with which it interacts. Behavior, 46 in this sense, may vary from one organism to another not only in accordance with the 47 biological structures responsible for linking external phenomena with internal states and 48 then to external manifestation of those states through actions taken by the organism, but 49 also according to the how that external information is organized, evaluated and acted upon 50 by the neural system of an organism. As neural systems in different species became more 51 extensive, the link between the genome and the forms and kinds of behavior expressed 52 by the organism with similar genomes has become less rigid. With our species we speak 53 of individuals imitating or learning behaviors or patterns of behavior from the individuals 54 with whom one interacts, and of individuals producing novel behavior-capacities that are 55 not unique to our species-without first requiring change at the genomic level and without 56 equivalent variability at the genomic level.
57
To account for these more complicated behaviors the Darwinian evolutionary model has 58 been expanded to include the way in which fitness relates not just to the characteristics of 59 a trait expressed by an individual (individual fitness), but can take into account interactions 60 among the provider of sperm, the provider of an ovum and the developing zygote produced 61 through the intersection of the sperm and the ovum. Terms such as mate selection, in-62 clusive fitness, reciprocal altruism, mate investment and parental investment all recognize 63 the importance of behavioral interaction of individuals for a measure of fitness. Simi-64 larly, the notion of inheritance of traits has been expanded to include non-genomic inheri-65 tance of behavior through individual interaction in the form of imitation and learning (e.g., 66 Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman, 1981; Boyd and Richerson, 1985) as well as the inheritance of 67 concepts and ideas through assessment of those concepts and ideas (e.g., Dawkins, 1989 ; 68 Durham, 1991 ) that may lead to novel behaviors.
69
Despite an expanded view of what constitutes biological evolution, still lacking is an 70 adequate understanding of why and how a shift was made from selection acting at the level 71 of behaviors to selection acting at the level of concepts, symbols and symbolic systems as 72 occurs within the domain that we refer to as culture. Just as biological evolution defined 73 solely in terms of changes in the genomic system does not adequately account for the full 74 range of behavioral complexity that emerged from evolutionary events at the genomic level, 75 evolution defined solely in terms of transmittal of behavior and transmittal of "mental units" 76 Complex society n ∼ n 1 n(n − 1)/2 ∼ n 2 n(n − 1)(n − 2)/6 ∼ n 3 Etc. At the other extreme, define a complex society to be one in which each member of 110 the society is capable of exhibiting a unique behavior(s), so that knowing the behavior of 111 individual A does not allow for predicting the full range of possible behaviors by individual 112 B. Hence for an individual to align one's behavior in accordance with behaviors occurring 113 within the group, one must take into account all individuals, all dyads, all triads and so on 114 (see figure 2 and Table 1 ). Thus "a monkey, taking the probable actions of a third party into 115 account, is facing a more challenging world than an animal that only interacts dyadically . . . " 116 (Byrne and Whiten, 1997, p. 11). For a complex society the overall coherence of the group 117 will depend on group size since the componential demands on an individual for aligning 118 one's behavior in accordance with the behavior of all group members increases exponentially 119 with group size when each group member has a distinct set of behaviors. For societies 120 between these extremes the complexity of interactions will be determined by the number 121 of distinct behavior sets, but that complexity will only be partially related to the group size 122 if introducing more individuals does not increase the number of distinct behavior sets. 
Individuation and Social Complexity
124
Presumably inter-individual interaction plays a prominent role in acquisition of information 125 from conspecifics since it is through interaction with other individuals, or sets of individuals, 126 
161
With individuation may also come greater inter-group isolation since individuals from 162 one group will be less well known in terms of their behavior from the viewpoint of the 163 individuals in another group, thus making encounters between groups more problematic. In 164 simple societies, groups are made up of individuals sharing the same behavior sets; hence 165 fusion and fission are less difficult since, whether an individual is from one subgroup or 166 another subgroup, the behaviors with which an individual must cope are similar. Thus fission 167 and fusion of groups as a means to accommodate local environmental conditions such as 168 resource density and patchiness is not problematic from the viewpoint of the behaviors 169 that need to be incorporated when fusion takes place. As individuation increases, however, 170 a trade-off arises between the advantages of individuals or sets of individuals moving 171 from one group to another as a way to balance current group size against environmental 172 conditions versus the time needed to be spent in individual interaction as a way to align 173 one's behavior with the behavior of other members of a group and to make the group 174 coherent. With greater individuation there should be negative feedback between, on the one 175 hand, increased interaction of individuals within a group to facilitate internally coherency 176 which then leads to increasing isolation of groups from one another as inter-group transfer 177 of individuals becomes less feasible and, on the other hand, increasing isolation of groups 178 acting as a "push" for greater internal cohesion since fissioning and reformation of groups 179 becomes less feasible as a means to ameliorate conflict within a group. 
Primate Pattern: Old World Monkeys and Chimpanzees
181
Within the anthropoids we can see a shift in these trends by comparing Pan with the Old 182 World monkeys. The pattern among Old Worlds monkeys appears to be one of stable 183 groups of around 20-30 individuals. In some species these are the largest groups (and 184 encounters of groups may evoke either avoidance or aggressive displays but generally not 185 physical contact) and in other species several groups may combine together to form groups 186 of around 10-200 individuals (see Table 2 ). Group structure centers on matrilines with 187 stable dominance hierarchies among females, which facilitates kin selection as a means for 188 transmitting social behaviors that increase group coherency. Transfer by males is generally 189 Gouzoules, 1987 (see Table 22 223 and deliberately killed at least three adult males and one adult female. They were suspected 224 of killing two additional adult males . . . " (Nishida and Hiraiwa-Hasegawa, 1987) . For Pan 225 troglodytes the social problem to be resolved appears to center around interaction among 226 males in a group without close genetic linkages (e.g., genetic father/son linkages) and on 227 the problem of interaction among males with a high degree of individuality.
228
It appears that the biological mechanisms available for group coherence may have reached 229 an upper limit among the Old World monkeys with regard to the degree of individuation that 230 can be sustained while maintaining group coherence at a size commensurate with efficient 231 foraging. The social structure organized through stable matrilines allows for behavioral 232 traits that relate to group coherence to be transmitted via biological kin selection among 233 females and is expressed in the form of stable female dominance hierarchies. Fission and 234 fusion of troops without aggressive encounters is still feasible.
235
The pattern among the great apes is strikingly different and suggestive of reverting to 236 smaller social groups as a way to accommodate the cognitive difficulty of dealing with more 237 individualized behavior. The most extreme case is Pongo pongo with a solitary social struc-238 ture, virtually unique among the anthropoids. While chimpanzees have communities based 239 on adult males, the social pattern appears to be one of developing mechanisms that enable 240 group structure to emerge despite a high degree of individuation. Adult females among Pan 241 troglodytes are not part of the community structure and appear to have a dispersal pattern sim-242 ilar to that of Pongo pongo females (Wrangham, 1979 as a means to accommodate individuation. In hominid evolution the reversal occurs through
259
introducing a means for social integration despite high levels of individuation. The reversal,
260
I suggest, has been achieved through the construction of culturally constructed kin rela-
261
tions as a way of organizing societies in such a way that kin can be recognized through a 262 conceptual framework rather than through biological properties. This also allows for behav- The difficulty with sharing, though, is that it requires a solution to the Prisoner's Dilemma 290 game; that is, it requires a solution that eliminates the possibility of cheating by one group 291 or the other. The means for so doing, based on extant hunter-gatherer societies, lies in a 292 culturally defined system of intergroup cooperation constructed around culturally defined 293 kin that transcends individual decision making. By culture I mean a shared, constructed, conceptual system that frames the context within Au: Pls. check Section no. is Ok.
296
which behavior takes place. A simple example of a "constructed reality" can be seen with 297 the cultural notion of "humanness." By "humanness" I mean the conceptualization (for 298 better or for worse) that members of a society have of themselves in contrast to their 299 conceptualizations of individuals outside of one's society. Whether it be expressed in the 300 form of self-identification of one's group as "the real people" as occurs in many small 301 scale societies, or a religious identification as "the chosen people," or a notion of "civilized 302 people" as occurs with nation/states, the common theme is the presumption that behavior 303 in one's group-in contrast with the behavior of individuals in other groups-is subject to 304 constraints based on shared notions of morality, law, and ethics, hence actions taken by one 305 individual against another individual in one's group that violate norms of expected behavior 306 are subject to censure and punishment.
307
In the continuous biological cycle of fertilization, birth, growth, reproduction and death, 308 a dividing line between not-human and human is introduced to decide when, in this cycle, an 309 action taken against a biological organism becomes instead an action against a human, hence 310 moral judgement about the action (and punishment) is appropriate, versus when the same 311 kind of action is not subject to moral judgement. In the United States it is evident that two dif-312 ferent cultural constructions for that dividing line exist currently with regard to the question 313 of abortion. For those against abortion the dividing line occurs at conception and so abortion 314 becomes morally reprehensible and equivalent to murder. For those in favor of abortion the 315 dividing line occurs at birth and so abortion prior to birth lies outside of moral judgement. 316 From an analytical perspective, both positions agree that there is a point at which the 317 developing biological entity changes status from simply being a biological entity to one in 318 which humanness has become a feature; the disagreement is on the action that engenders 319 this transformation. In the one case it is by the action of a male through fertilization of 320 an ovum and in the other case it is by the action of a female through giving birth. Neither 321 concept has biological reality, as the notion of humanness is a cultural concept, not a 322 biological feature. And even using a biological stage in the continuous process of life is not 323 necessary for the demarcation between being non-human and human. Some groups such as 324 the Netsilik Eskimo living along Hudson Bay in Canada used a non-biological criterion for 325 the transformation. Among traditional Netsilik Eskimos, humanness entered at the point of 326 naming a newborn by the mother for the spirit that helped her in giving birth to the child 327 (Balikci, 1970) .
328
All three examples of imposing a break in the continuity of biological development share 329 the same conceptual framework of introducing a discontinuity into a continuous process and 330 in all three cases the choice of the discontinuity is arbitrary in the sense that it does not arise 331 These two examples illustrate the sense in which culture will be used here as being 358 composed of shared, conceptual constructs imposed on the external world; that is, the 359 "objects" making up culture will be viewed as part of the ideational domain of concepts 360 and ideas (Keesing, 1974) that is mapped onto the phenomenological domain comprised of 361 the world external to us. It will be assumed that cultural distinctions, as shown in the above 362 two examples, do not simply reflect the properties of the phenomenological domain but 363 instead they impose a structure over that domain with properties that need not be derivable 364 from the domain. It will further be assumed that culture, in the sense being used here, must 365 be composed of shared conceptual systems in order for it to provide predictability about 366 behaviors. It is this latter property that enables, it will be argued, cultural constructs to 367 accommodate individuation by also being able to provide predictability when behaviors are 368 formed in accordance with shared cultural constructs. 
Empirical Genetic Relations versus Conceptual Genealogical Relations
370
The context for the argument will be the transition from primate groups characterized, as 371 discussed above, by social behavior directed towards biological kin (e.g., kin selection) 372 to forms of social organization based on culturally constructed kinship relations. For the 373 former, the empirical structure formed through biological reproduction engendering genetic 374 connectedness for pairs of individuals through a common ancestor (see figure 4) is central 375 to the pattern of social interaction among individuals that can arise through Darwinian 376 selection. The extent to which the behavior of individual X towards individual Y can be 377 introduced through selective benefits arising from social interactions relates to the degree of 378 biological relatedness between X and Y . The standard measure for the biological relatedness 379 
392
When we shift to culturally constructed sets of kin, the closest analogue to the structure 
414
While it is true that genealogical mother is generally the biological mother, the con-415 ceptual basis for genealogical father is highly variable. In some societies (e.g., Australian 416 aboriginal groups) the man currently married to genealogical mother is considered to be the 417 genealogical father regardless of his genetic status with regard to the individual identified as 418 his child. And even in the case of genealogical mother the way adoption is conceptualized 419 in many societies makes it clear that genealogical mother is not simply the genetic mother. 420 In cases of adoption the adopted parents may be as much the genealogical father and the 421 genealogical mother as are genetic fathers and mothers when there is no adoption. Groups 422 such as the Inuit do not make a distinction between one's status as parent through biological 423 birth or through adopting a child (Maxwell, 1996) , for example.
424
In neither of these examples does identification of a woman as genealogical mother or a 425 man as genealogical father who has no genetic relation to the person in question arise simply 426 from ignorance of who the genetic parents may be. Thus it is appropriate to view genealogical 427 tracing as being based upon assignment of genealogical mother and genealogical father in a 428 manner that need not be constrained by "best guesses" about the empirical facts of genetic 429 fathers and mothers. Otherwise it would be difficult to account for societies such as the 430 Nayar where it was important to identify some male as the "father" of a child, but whether 431 he was the genetic father was not of any particular concern even when the mother knew who 432 was the genetic father. Consequently, as argued by Read (2001) , we can view genealogical 433 tracing as a shift from the phenomenological domain to the ideational domain wherein the 434 empirical, genetic statuses of genetic father and genetic mother have been replaced by the 435 conceptual statuses of genealogical father and genealogical mother and where the content 436 of the relations has no a priori, genetic constraint. 
Genealogy and Behavior: Roles
438
The system of genealogical tracing makes it possible to shift behavior directed towards 439 genealogical kin away from a phenomenological, Darwinian framework in which there must 440 be genetic connection in order for new behaviors to be introduced, to a conceptual framework 441 in which behaviors directed towards genealogical kin identified through genealogical tracing 442 no longer required a genetic connection as a prerequisite for a behavior to be introduced. So 443 long as there is common agreement that a (genealogical) father should act in such and such 444 a way towards his (genealogical) children, for example, the fact of being identified as the 445 father of the children, regardless of one's actual genetic status vis-à-vis those individuals, 446 can trigger both the behavior of the male in question (i.e., he takes on the "father role") and 447 the possibility of sanctions being imposed on him were he to fail to act as a father should act. 
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In addition, identifying a conceptual relation rather than simply the empirical fact of 
467
In contrast, a conceptual relation such as "genealogical father" can be extended recur- 
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504
Consequently, the shift from behaviors arising through reproductive fitness acting through 505 the genetic structure connecting individuals to behaviors associated with conceptual re-506 lations and roles has had a profound effect on the formation of social groups and how 507 groups can be organized together in larger units. Group cohesion, for example, can arise 508 through a group being composed of individuals who consider themselves to be genealogi-509 cal relatives to each other in conjunction with the social behaviors and roles linked to the 510 various relations that can be constructed through recursion. In terms of our hominid ances-511 tors, to the extent that group cohesion translates into competitive advantage with respect 512 to obtaining resources this shift would also have changed the dynamics of evolutionary 513 change away from evolution driven by reproductive success at the individual level (indi-514 vidual competition) to evolution driven by reproductive success at the group level (group 515 competition). In addition, since roles are statuses that individuals can move into and out 516 of, individuation need only be temporarily suspended when taking on a role and acting 517 in accordance with that role. This implies that from the perspective of other individuals, 518 alignment of behavior shifts away from alignment based on "modeling" the behavioral 519 possibilities of individuals as discussed above for primates and illustrated in figure 2, to 520 one of alignment based on behaviors associated with roles. In effect, roles and their asso-521 ciated behaviors provide a simplified social world from a combinatorial viewpoint since 522 roles "make . . . behaviour predictable, that is expectable in a general sense" (Klüver, 2002, 523 p. 44, emphasis in the original). Interaction can be in terms of common understanding of 524 roles and associated behaviors (Nadel, 1957 
528
Yet the shift to social organization based around constructed genealogical relations does 529 not escape from the combinatorial problem that arose with individuation. Rather, it shifts 530 the combinatorial problem to a different plane. The combinatorial problem that arises with 531 genealogical relations is due to genealogical relations being defined recursively. If we take 532 into account the two primary genealogical relations, genealogical father and genealogical 533 mother, and the spouse relation, then the number of genealogical pathways connecting a 534 pair of individuals tracing back to a common genealogical ancestor ∼3 n , where n is as 535 defined for genetic relatedness. The value of n may be as large as 12 (tracing from one's 536 cousin (see figure 6 ). In general, kinship terminologies differ not only through language dif-550 ferences but also through the way genealogical relations are categorized through kin terms.
551
What appears to be common across kinship terminologies is the way the terminology 
559
The kind of calculation that is used to construct the kin term structure is straightforward.
560
Let three individuals be referred to as ego, alter while C is related to B as veitacini, sibling of the same sex, then it follows that A is related to
573
C as child to mother although they never before met or knew it. Kin terms are predictable.
574
If two people are each related to a third, then they are related to each other" (Sahlins, One particularly salient example of the importance of this kind of kin calculation for 579 social relations is provided by Marshall (1976) in her discussion of how a kin relation is 580 calculated through the kinship terminology by the !Kung san (a hunter/gatherer group living 581 in the Nyae Nyae portion of the Kalahari Desert of southern Africa). "Gao [a Nyae Nyae 582 !Kung] had never been to Khadum [to the north of the Nyae Nyae region] before. The !Kung 583 who lived there at once called him ju dole [dole: 'bad', 'worthless', 'potentially harmful']. 584 He was in haste to say that he had heard that the father of one of the people at Khadum 585 had the same name as his father and that another had a brother named Gao. 'Oh,' said the 586 Khadum people in effect, 'so you are Gao's !gun!a'.. . . " (1976, p 
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Figure 7. Cultural kinship between ego and alter only requires a common reference person for whom each of ego and alter have a kin term. Ego and alter use the kin terminology structure to deduce the kin term each has for the other person. Closeness of the relationship is culturally specified and may be independent of the number of genealogical steps between ego and alter.
In this example the individuals involved neither have knowledge of a genealogical path-
588
way through which they are connected nor do they need to know about such a pathway 589 before they can determine the kin term they would use for one another. In effect, they 
Kin Term Product
597
For there to be a computational device that can operate over the genealogical space, the 598 device must be definable separately from the genealogical space over which it will operate.
599
If we think of kin terms as (abstract) symbols, the computational aspect must reside in a logic 600 that permits taking "products" of kin term symbols to arrive at other kin term symbols in a 601 way such that the abstract process of taking products can be translated into operations within 
605
The counting numbers are symbols that represent a conceptual property, the cardinality of 
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different collections of objects so as to form a new collection of objects. More precisely, 611 in the symbolic domain when we add a pair of symbols n and m (i.e., a pair of counting 612 numbers) and obtain a third symbol, s, namely the sum of those two numbers, n + m, 613 the symbolic assignment s = n + m is done with a logic that ensures compatibility with 614 the cardinality of collections of objects and the formation of new collections by combing 615 together collections of objects. Thus for the symbolic operation n + m we can associate 616 the first number, n, with a collection of objects in the phenomenological whose cardinality 617 is represented by n. Similarly, we can associate the second number, m, with a collection 618 of objects with whose cardinality is represented by that number. Finally we combine these 619 two collections together and we find that the cardinality of this combined collection is 620 the counting number s, and so s = m + n is valid both at the symbolic level and in 621 terms of what the counting numbers represent in the phenomenological domain. 4 The use 622 of the addition operation acting on symbols in lieu of combining collections of objects 623 in the phenomenological domain depends on this translation process for its application 624 to the phenomenological domain. The power of the symbol system of arithmetic lies in 625 the fact that we can do the calculations by using the manipulation of symbols and leave 626 implicit the translation back to the phenomenological domain. In a similar way, the symbolic 627 manipulation of kin term symbols can be translated back into the phenomenological domain 628 of persons and genealogical relations between pairs of persons, but the translation is not 629 necessary and can be left implicit.
630
The computational system for the genealogical domain has the constraint that it must 631 be generated from a few, basic concepts if it is to serve as a simplification of the way 632 one traverses over the domain of all possible genealogical relations. The primary concept 633 underlying this computational process for kin terms is the product defined over pairs of kin 634 terms discussed above. We can formally define a kin term product as follows:
635
Definition. Let K and L be kin terms in a given kinship terminology, T. Let ego, alter 1 and 636 alter 2 refer to three arbitrary persons each of whose cultural repertoire includes the kinship 637 terminology, T. The kin term product of K and L, denoted K oL, is a kin term, M, if any, 638 that ego may (properly) use to refer to alter 2 when ego (properly) uses the kin term L to 639 refer to alter 1 and alter 2 (properly) uses the kin term K to refer to alter 2 .
640
We can determine the structure for a set of kin terms (i.e., a set of symbols in the 641 mathematical sense of symbols) that is engendered by the kin term product for the kin 642 terms in a kinship terminology by determining the product for each pair of kin terms in the 643 terminology. We can display these products in the form of a table whose entries for the first 644 column and first row are made up of the set of kin terms and whose entry in the intersection 645 of a row and a column is the result of taking the product of the initial terms in that row and 646 column. A table of this kind is called a Cayley Table. The Cayley Table, however, is too 647 general as the number of products in the table is ∼n 2 , where n is the number of kin terms 648 and so the combinatorial problem (though to a lesser degree) re-arises.
649
Simplification of the number of distinct products for a set of kin terms relates to the 650 structure engendered by taking kin term products. If this structure can be generated from an 651 underlying "kin term grammar" that identifies how all kin terms can be constructed from a 652 few, primary kin terms using kin term products, then we can reduce the Cayley Table to Self ↔ ego, Mother ↔ genealogical mother, Father ↔ genealogical father, Son ↔ genealogical son, Daughter ↔ genealogical daughter and Spouse ↔ {husband, wife}.
696
Second, we replace each genealogical relation in the genealogical pathway with its kin 697 term equivalent. Finally, we calculate, using the kin term map, the product of the kin 698 terms corresponding to each of the relations in the genealogical pathway to arrive at a kin 699 term that may properly be used by ego for alter. For example, if alter is ego's mother's 700 brother's daughter, then we have two possible genealogical pathways: (1) The algebraic structure not only establishes the fact that the kin term map has a logic 749 underlying its structure as shown in figure 10 for the AKT, but features of the kinship 750 terminology can now be divided into those whose origin lies in the logic of the kin term 751 map by virtue of the fact that they are displayed in the algebraic model for the kin term map 752 and those that are imposed, for cultural reasons, on the kinship terminology. Two important 753 
761
The criterion for the use of the -in-law suffix becomes apparent in the algebraic structure.
762
The Spouse element introduces a "third dimension" in the graphs (nodes in the lower left 763 of figure 10) and it is this set of nodes marked with an -in-law suffix or with the Spouse kin 764 term. In effect, the -in-law suffix distinguishes an affinal subspace of the complete kin term 765 structure.
766
The failure to use the -in-law suffix with terms such as aunt or uncle by marriage is due to 
Cultural Instantiation of the Kin Term Algebra
773
The kin term algebra is a symbolic system, hence the individuals to whom the terms may content. I refer to these rules, and the logic of their formation, application and change, 776 as the cultural instantiation of the abstract symbolic structure (Read, 2001 (Read, , 2003 )-see 777 figure 11. We have already had examples of cultural instantiation with the criterion used for 778 the conceptual division between not human and human, and with the concepts Friend and 779 Enemy whose instantiation can include content as diverse as persons, numbers or nations. 780 For the kin term structure cultural instantiation using genealogical relations refers back to 781 the computational problem being solved by the kinship terminology, namely an effective 782 way to traverse over the genealogical domain.
783
This instantiation has been discussed above with regard to kin terms. We can now extend 784 this instantiation to the symbolic structure. In the case of the AKT we have: P → {father, 785 mother}, C → {son, daughter}, I → {ego}, S → {husband, wife}. We can translate any 786 algebraic product into a set of genealogical relations by defining the product of sets of 787 genealogical relations in matrix form. If A, B ∈ A and U and V are the sets of genealogical 788 relations corresponding to A and B, respectively; that is A → U and B → V , then 789 KL → V T × U . where V T is the transpose of the matrix V . For example, CP → {father, 790 mother} × {son, daughter} = {father's son, father's daughter, mother's son, mother's 791 daughter}.
792
By using this instantiation and the isomorphism between the kin term map and the 793 algebraic representation of the kin term map, we can construct a set of predicted genealogical 794 relations corresponding to each kin term in the AKT; namely, if K is a kin term then K → 795 
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A ∈ A and A = A 1 A 2 . . . A n , say, where
where A 1 → U 1 , A 2 → U 2 , . . . , A n → U n and U is a set of genealogical relations.
797
The predicted set of genealogical relations agrees in all cases with the genealogical 798 definition of kin terms given by English speakers (Read, 2001 a genealogical child by a kin term would refer to the adopted child by the same kin term.
812
Hence the legal apparatus in the U.S. in cases of adoption serves to assure to all involved 813 parties that the adopted child is to be considered no differently than a "natural" child and for the former and female-female genital rubbing for the latter) as a way to deal with the 841 problems introduced by having a high degree of individuation. Neither species has worked 842 out a solution leading to coherent and stable groups that include both sexes as is true for 843 the Old World Monkeys.
844
It appears that natural selection was unable to find a biologically based means to make 845 group cohesion possible when there is increased individuation, given the social conflict that 846 arises when individuation includes individuals outside of the range of biological kin among 847 whom biological processes such as kin selection, inclusive fitness, reciprocal altruism, etc. 848 can introduce stable, cooperative behavior. The solution found by our hominid ancestors 849 arose through relations conceptualized between individuals, hence relations that link indi-850 viduals that are not dependent upon a genetic linkage for their implementation. In modern 851 Homo sapiens we refer to these as genealogical relations and they are based on recursively 852 tracing from one individual to another individual via a person identified as the genealogical 853 mother or the genealogical father of that person.
854
The relations and tracing arise through a conceptually constructed system and are not 855 simply a "best attempt" to model the genetic relations involved in procreation. Ethnographic 856 evidence repeatedly indicates that the individual identified as the genealogical father need 857 not be the genetic father even if the person who is the genetic father is known. And some 858 groups such as the Inuit do not make any distinction between a child through adoption 859 and a child through birth. The shift from an externally driven system (natural selection 860 acting on genetic linkages) to an internally constructed conceptual system had profound 861 implications for our hominid ancestors. The conceptual system of constructed relations 862 "solved" the problem of identifying related individuals who can be presumed to share 863 similar ideas about proper and appropriate behavior, hence laid the basis for cooperative 864 behavior through providing a means to identify likely cooperators.
865
However, the "solution" to the identification problem for models of how cooperative be-866 havior may evolve and become a stable "strategy" re-introduced the combinatorial problem 867 that arose with individuation, but in a different plane, namely the size of the genealogi-868 cal domain that is possible under genealogical tracing. The solution to that combinatorial 869 problem was achieved through devising a conceptual system-what we refer to as a kin-870 ship terminology-that was simple, yet powerful, and made it possible to traverse over the 871 genealogical domain without detailed knowledge about its structure for a particular group 872 of persons. The kinship terminology is not simply a collection of semantic terms that may 873 be used when referring to one's kin, but a conceptual system with an underlying logic, or 874 grammar, as to how it may be produced and how it relates to the genealogical domain. 875 Human societies have two conceptual domains that can be used for constructing relations 876 between individuals: the genealogical system based on genealogical tracing and the kin term 877 system based on the logic of calculating with kin terms. The results from one system can 878 be translated into the other system. In addition, the kin term system, through the process of 879 cultural instantiation of the abstract symbols making up the terminology, is not constrained 880 in its application to the genealogical domain and has made it possible for human societies 881 
